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Abstract
In the past few decades spatial econometric models have become a standard tool
in empirical research. Nevertheless applications in binary-choice models remain
scarce. This paper makes use of Bayesian Spatial Probit Models to model and
estimate spatial interactions in location decisions. For this purpose, we focus on
the Austrian retail gasoline market, which is going through a process of remarkable
structural changes. A short analysis shows that, during the last decade 10.9% of
the stations had left the market and a percentage of 29.6% had either left the
market or had changed the brand. This paper aims at investigating this process.
A special characteristic of this market is the local competition structure which is
characterized by spatial dependencies along local competitors. To capture these
spatial dependencies and since the dependent variable is binary in nature (an exit
had taken place or not), we apply a Bayesian spatial probit model using MCMC
estimation on station level data for the whole Austrian retail gasoline market. Our
results suggest, that the decision to leave the market, does not only depend on own
characteristics, but also on competitors. In particular, we find the exit decisions
to exhibit a negative spatial correlation. Moreover, our model allows to quantify
spatial spillover effects of this market.
Keywords: Bayesian Spatial Probit Model, Exit, Gasoline retailing, Spatial com-
petition.
JEL Code: L13, L81, C21
1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized a central tradeoff in spatial location choice: ’steal-
ing’ customers by locating closer to competitors comes at the cost of intensified price
competition (Marshall, 1920). While there is a large volume of theoretical research
analyzing strategic location decisions, only very few empirical studies (Seim (2006)
and Watson (2005)) explicitly consider the spatial dimension when investigating
firms’ entry and/or exit decisions. The present paper uses a unique panel-data set
for retail gasoline stations in Austria for the period from 2003 to 2011 to investigate
firms’ exit decisions econometrically. The geographical location of each gasoline sta-
tion is linked to information on the Austrian road system which allows generating
accurate measures of distance (measured in driving time in minutes) as well as the
neighborhood relations between all gasoline stations in the network of roads.
In the past few decades the Austrian retail gasoline market has experienced
considerable structural changes. According to the annual reports of the Austrian
Economic Chamber the number of gasoline stations has decreased from 4,061 in
1988 to 2,575 stations at the end of 2011. This corresponds to a decline by almost
37%.1 Between 2003 and 2011, 10.9% of the stations were shut down and 29.6% had
either left the market or had changed the brand. The aim of this paper is to identify
the key factors of and to shed light on the rationalization process of the Austrian
retail gasoline market.
In terms of econometric methods to investigate this issue, it is important to note
that individual exit decisions are binary in nature (exit ’yes’ or ’no’). To investi-
gate discrete exit choices in a spatial context, we apply a Bayesian spatial probit
model using MCMC estimation (LeSage (2000) and LeSage and Pace (2004)) on
station level data for the Austrian gasoline market.2 These types of models account
1Similar changes have been observed for the US and Canadian gasoline markets (Eckert and
West, 2005).
2In the past thirty years spatial econometric models have become a standard tool in empirical
research. Nevertheless applications in binary-choice models remain scarce. Anselin (2010) provides
an excellent overview of the development of this field.
1
for spatial correlation between observations and are appropriate when oligopolistic
interdepencies are characterized by spatial spillovers. In this model we incorporate
the spatial competition structure of the gasoline market to test if distance and local
market characteristics, as well as individual and neighboring station characteristics
have an influence on the exit probability of a gasoline station.
A special characteristic of the gasoline market is that competition is highly local-
ized. Consumers typically prefer to buy gasoline at stations in the neighborhood of
their residence (van Meerbeck, 2003) or at stations lying on their commuting path
(Houde, 2012). Search and transportation costs play a crucial role in the demand
for gasoline. Therefore, as in most spatial markets, retailers recognize only their
nearest neighbors as relevant competitors (Benson et al., 1992). Despite the many
stations in the analyzed market, oligopolistic interdependencies are present in each
of these local markets. Market structure is characterized by a few large companies
or retail chains, so called ’majors’, dominating the market and operating outlets
in most local markets. On the other hand, smaller retail chains are also present
in the market which are called ’minors’. There also exists a large number of small
firms (’independent’ or ’unbranded’ stations) which are only active in a few or even
only one local market. Further, gasoline is a homogeneous product with respect
to its chemical properties and stations differentiate by providing additional services
(shops, opening hours, attendant service etc.) as well as in terms of space. Previous
studies for the gasoline market suggest that the spatial interdependence between
adjacent competitors can have significant price effects. Pennerstorfer (2009) and
Firgo et al. (2012) analyze different aspects of pricing in this market and provide
evidence for the existence of spatial correlation. Ignoring this neighborhood effects
can lead to biased parameter estimates (LeSage and Pace, 2009).
The contribution of this paper should on the one hand be a detailed analysis
of the exits in the Austrian retail gasoline market, as to our knowledge no such
study exits. Therefore, its first aim is to net out the influencing parameters of these
movements. On the other hand, in our model we will also incorporate the different
types and the ownership structure of stations. In this paper we also evaluate the
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consequences on the exit probability due to a merger in the Austrian gasoline market.
Go¨tz and Gugler (2006) analyzed the correlation between market concentration and
product variety in the Austrian gasoline market and found that a more concentrated
market lowers the product variety. Put differently, a higher market concentration,
due to merger for example, indicates exits. At the beginning of 2003, BP, a major
brand of the Austrian gasoline market acquired 98 gasoline stations of the minor
ARAL. BP’s acquisition of the ARAL stations, which where dispersed all over the
country, caused changes in the market concentration of local markets which included
an ARAL station, whereas others (submarkets not including an ARAL station)
remained unaffected. These binary and differential changes can be used to test if
merger have an effect on the rationalization process of an industry.3
Early work regarding retail location comes from Hotelling (1929), who shows
how the own location as well as the location of rival firms effect the own profit
maximization. Reilly (1931), for instance, established a retail gravitation law and
related it to shopping behavior and store location decision. Clustering behavior
which is often observed in retail industries was explained, among others, by Fujita
and Smith (1990), Brown (1994), Hinloopenaand and van Marrewijk (1999).
Our paper makes also a contribution to the broader literature on entry and exit,
which can be divided into inter- and intra-industry studies. Berry and Reiss (2007)
give an excellent overview for work on structural models of entry, exit and market
concentrations, who in a game-theoretical framework analyze the long run equilib-
rium number of firms. Geroski (1995) surveys empirical work regarding entry, exit
and turnover patterns in different industries. He established seven stylized facts
about entry, exit and industry dynamics and linked the empirical evidence to the
theory.4 He summarizes papers which analyze the location decisions of homoge-
nous and heterogeneous firms within and between industries. The majority of this
research has been done for the manufacturing sector.
3Related studies who analyze some aspect of mergers in the gasoline market are among others:
Eckert and West (2006), Hastings and Gilbert (2005), Taylor and Hosken (2007), Simpson and
Taylor (2008), Taylor and Zimmerman (2010), Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013).
4Another survey on this research topic is from Caves (1998).
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A closely related paper to ours is Eckert and West (2005). The authors estimate a
probit model using station, market structure, demographic, locational and firm type
characteristics as explanatory variables to test different rationalization hypotheses
for the Canadian gasoline market in the period from 1991 to 2002.5
The existing literature on entry and exit in the retail industry uses spatial ex-
planatory variables to incorporate the spatial dimension of competition of this mar-
kets. In contrast, we use the geographical information on stations to model the
spatial dependency among stations explicitly via an autoregressive spatial probit
model, similar to LeSage et al. (2011). LeSage et al. (2011) analyze reopening de-
cisions of establishments located on three major streets in New Orleans six months
after they where destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. The authors state that the de-
cision to reopen a firm is likely to depend on decisions made by neighboring firms,
since firms offering complementary services can experience spatial spillovers. In or-
der to test the existence of spatial dependence and since the dependent variable is
binary (1 for reopened firms and 0 otherwise), they apply a binary spatial probit
model. In the model estimation LeSage et al. (2011) control among others for flood
depth, firm size and income.
Our empirical analysis explicitly controls for the various station, market and
demographic characteristics, spatial neighborhood effects as well as the ownership
structure of gasoline stations (membership in large networks). Furthermore, these
type of models allow for differentiating between direct as well as indirect effects of
exogenous variables (the effect of variables on the exit probability of the observed
station as well as the effect on the exit probability of neighboring stations).
In general, we find a significant negative spatial correlation regarding the exit
decision of stations in the Austrian gasoline market. This result suggests, that the
probability to exit the market is lower if the neighbor left the market. Overall, it
seems that the exit of stations is not only influenced by own characteristics but also
by competitors characteristics and by the composition of the own limited market.
5Eckert and West (2005) do not ignore the possibility of spatial correlation. Moran’s I test does
not reject the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in the estimated errors which implies that
estimating a simple probit model is appropriate.
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Moreover, this work adds to the empirical literature on structural changes of
the gasoline industry and improves our knowledge of firms’ entry and exit behavior.
Finally, this paper contributes to the spatial econometric literature of discrete choice
model applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the data,
section 3 introduces the estimation procedure and reports the empirical results and
section 4 concludes.
2 Data
The empirical analysis utilizes three different data sets. The first contains infor-
mation on the spatial and site characteristics of all gasoline stations in Austria in
the year 2003 collected by Experian Catalist. The second data set contains the
same information for all active stations in the year 2011 obtained from Petrolview,
a split-off company from Catalist6. By merging the two data sets, we are able to
identify the structural changes which occured in this market between 2003 and 2011.
We categorized the stations into four groups: still active, changed brand, shut down
and new station. If a station is active both in 2003 and 2011 in the same place and
under the same brand, it was categorized as ’still active’. The category ’changed
brand’ represents stations that are operated on the same location but have changed
their brand between 2003 and 2011. If a gasoline station no longer is operated in
2011, it was classified in the third category ’shut down’. Stations which are only
present in the dataset from 2011 represent market entries and thus were classified
as ’new stations’. The third data set contains information on the population and
size of the municipalities and the districts of this region, as a part of the population
census collected by the Austrian statistical office in 2001. Table 1 reports descriptive
statistics for all metric and dummy variables included in the empirical model. The
variables used in the estimations can be grouped into three blocks. In the first group
we control for the competition and spatial characteristics of local markets. ‘NO. IN-
6See www.catalist.com and www.petrolview.com for company details.
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DEPENDENTS’ measures how many of the ten nearest neighbors are independent
stations. Assuming that independent competitors set prices more aggressively would
suggest a positive impact of this variable on exit probabilities. ‘AVERAGE DIS-
TANCE’ represents the average distance to the ten nearest neighbors and therefore
measures the degree of spatial differentiation. We expect this variable to lower the
exit probability as a greater distance to the neighbors reduces the intensity of com-
petition. The variable ‘DEALER’ equals one if a station is operated by a dealer
and zero otherwise. A dealer-owned stations is an indicator for a franchised outlet,
whereas a company-owned station is a vertically integrated station. Further, we
include the information if the stations belongs to one of the ten major brands or
not (UNBRANDED) to test for an asymmetry in the exit probability between these
two types of stations. The probability of exiting the market might also be related
to characteristics of the individual gasoline station. The variable ‘SHOP’ indicates
if the station has an convenient shop. The dummy variable ‘24H OPEN’ equals
one if the stations is operated non-stop and zero otherwise. Further, we include a
group of dummy variables (SPEED: < 40km/h, SPEED: 40 − 60km/h, SPEED:
61− 80km/h, SPEED: 80− 100km/h) which indicate the speed limit of the street
were the station is located. The category ‘SPEED: 80− 100km/h’ serve as the ref-
erence category and therefore is excluded from the estimation. ‘ATTENDANT’ is
also a binary explanatory variable containing the information if the station offers an
attendant service or not. The variables ‘SIZE ≤ 800m2’, ’SIZE: 800−2000m2’, ’SIZE
> 2000m2’ are dummy variables which measure the ground surface of the location.
Again, ‘SIZE > 2000m2’ as the reference category is excluded from the estimation.
In addition to these station characteristics, we also consider proxy-variables for re-
gional differences in demand: ‘COMMUTERS’ represents the ratio of incoming plus
outgoing commuters to population on a district level and ‘POPDENS’ measures the
population density on a district level in 1000 inhabitants per km2. The variable
’PURCHASE POWER’ represents the ratio of inhabitants to employed people and
serves as a proxy for the purchase power on a district level. For these variables, we
expect to find a negative impact on the probability of exit since a higher value of
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these variables indicates a higher demand and therefore a lower exit probability. As
stated in the previous section, in the beginning of 2003 all 98 ARAL stations of the
Austrian gasoline market where acquired by BP. To test if the merger of ARAL and
BP has an effect on the exit probability of these stations, in our model we included
the dummy variable ’ARAL’, which equals one if the stations was an ARAL station.
Following Go¨tz and Gugler (2006) we expect a positive effect of this variable on the
exit probability since a higher market concentration is argued to lead to more exits.
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Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics for empirical model
Symbol Definition Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Minimum Maximum
Competition and Spatial Variables
NO. INDEPENDENTS Number of stations within the then nearest neighbors which are
independent stations
2.089
(1.593)
0 9
AVERAGE DISTANCE Average distance to the ten nearest neighbors measures in driving
time in minutes
36.046
(24.046)
0.01 99.97
DEALER Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the location is owned
by a dealer
0.349
(0.477)
0 1
UNBRANDED Dummy variable which is set equal to one if station does not belong
to one of ten major brands
0.238
(0.426)
0 1
ARAL Dummy variable which is set equal to one if station is an ARAL
outlet
0.036
(0.019)
0 1
Location Specific Variables
SHOP Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the location has a
convenience store
0.758
(0.426)
0 1
24H OPEN Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the location is operated
non-stop
0.171
(0.376)
0 1
SPEED: ≤ 40km/h Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the speed limit on the
main road next to the location is smaller than 40km/h
0.066
(0.249)
0 1
SPEED: 40− 60km/h Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the speed limit on the
main road next to the location is between 40 and 60km/h
0.748
(0.434)
0 1
SPEED: 61− 80km/h Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the speed limit on the
main road next to the location is between 61 and 80km/h
0.142
(0.349)
0 1
SPEED: 81− 100km/h Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the speed limit on the
main road next to the location is between 81 and 100km/h (baseline
category)
0.023
(0.149)
0 1
ATTENDANT Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the location has an
attendant service
0.267
(0.442)
0 1
SIZE ≤ 800m2 Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the ground surface of
the location is smaller than 800m2
0.343
(0.475)
0 1
SIZE: 800− 2000m2 Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the ground surface of
the location is between 800 and 2000m2
0.384
(0.486)
0 1
SIZE > 2000m2 Dummy variable which is set equal to one if the ground surface of
the location is bigger than 2000m2 (baseline category)
0.248
(0.432)
0 1
Indicators of demand and value of alternative use
POPDENS Population density of the municipality level in 1000 inhabitants per
km2
10.196
(26.019)
0.016 255.891
PURCHASE POWER Ratio of inhabitants to employed people on a district level 0.482
(0.030)
0.073 1.105
COMMUTERS Ratio of incoming plus outgoing commuters to population on a
district level
0.537
(0.106)
0.177 0.829
PROPERTY Log of average property prices in the district in Euros per square
meter 2005
2.544
(2.232)
0 5.637
# of observations: 2738
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For the purpose of estimating the exit probability of one station, we defined the
binary dependent variable as follows:
exit =
1, if category ’changed brand’ or ’shut down’0, if category ’still active’ (1)
The motivation for this definition of the dependent variable lies in the theoretical
definition of exit. In theory a firm decides to leave the market if the value of exiting
(sell-off value) is greater than the discounted expected profits of staying in the
market. It should be clear, that the stations which belong to the category ’shut
down’ exited the market, since these stations are not longer operated in 2011. On
the other hand, when a stations’ brand changed it means that the ownership of this
station changed between 2003 and 2011. Suppose, an OMV station in 2003 was
operated as a Shell station in 2011.7 On the one hand this means an exit for OMV
and on the other hand, a new entry for Shell. Therefore, if a station was operated
on the same location but has changed its brand between 2003 and 2011, the the
company or dealer which operated the station in 2003 exited the market. However,
if the station was only renamed, due to a merger or an acquisition (such as the
ARAL stations which where acquired by BP), it was not classified as an exit.
Our paper also addresses the question whether the exit probability is different
for the different types of outlets (’branded’ and ’unbranded’ stations).
Table 2: Exits by station types
Unbranded Branded Total
Exit 220 617 837
Percentage of all Exits 26.28% 73.72% 100%
Percentage in station category 33.63% 28.22%
Nr. of stations = 2,822; Unbranded = 654; Branded = 2,168
Table 2 reports the number of exits of the Austrian gasoline market by station
types. From all 837 station exits between 2003 and 2011 the majority (73.72%)
7In this period there was no acquisition between these two companies.
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are branded stations. However, the table suggests that the share of exiting stations
seems to be larger for unbranded stations compared to branded stations. Whereas
33.63% of all unbranded stations exited, only a portion of 28.22% of all branded
stations left the market. In the econometric model we test whether there is an
asymmetry in the exit probability of branded and unbranded stations and if the
presence of an unbranded station has an impact on the exit probability of branded
stations which was stated by Eckert and West (2005).
Before we are able to estimate a spatial model some important consideration on
how to use the geographical information of the stations to define the local markets
for the gasoline industry have to be made. For estimation of the exit probability of a
station we treat the whole Austrian gasoline market as a network of firms which are
connected through the Austrian road system. Therefore, we attach the information
on geo-coordinates of the stations to the road network and calculate distances from
one station to all others using GIS-software. By calculating distances, which are
measured in driving time (minutes) and thus incorporate speed limits, we are able
to account for local competition.
A number of different definitions for local markets exist in the empirical liter-
ature on the gasoline industry. Some use a critical value of distance or a certain
number of neighbors for creating the local competition criterion. For example, Slade
(1987) studies price-wars in the gasoline industry of Vancouver and defines a single
local market as a street segment. Pinske and Slade (1998) investigate the spatial
pattern of contracting in the Vancouver gasoline industry using six different metrics
of closeness; all of them are some measure of physical distance between firms and are
used in the form of a spatial weight matrix. Other studies using critical distances for
defining local competitors are Hastings (2004), Netz and Taylor (2002), Pennerstor-
fer (2009). For identifying the local competitors of one station when estimating the
exit probability, we adopt the approach from Firgo et al. (2012) who use a critical
number of neighbors. They argue that using a critical distance is appropriate in an
area where the density of firms and consumers is homogenous (e.g. a metropolitan
area), whereas it is hard to find an adequate critical distance in areas where the
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distribution of both is heterogeneous. In our analysis, we include all stations of the
Austrian gasoline market, thus there are observation in urban and rural regions. For
this reason, we use a critical number of neighbors for defining the local competitors
of one firm, as this enables us to control for the different distribution of consumers
and firms in the sample. How these local markets and neighborhood relations enter
the estimation is described in more detail in the next section.
3 Estimation and Results
Since the dependent variable in this case is binary, firm i had exit the market or
not, a model for the analysis of binary outcomes has to be applied. A conventional
probit model would explain variation in the binary dependent variable y using the
matrix of exogenous variables X which is associated with the vector of estimated
parameters β, under the assumption that the observations are independent of each
other. However, in case of spatially dependent observations, standard logit or probit
estimations results in inconsistent and inefficient parameter estimates (McMillen,
1992). Spatial correlation in the residuals could be the result of similar unobserved
characteristics of adjacent competitors or could indicate the existence of a strategic
interdependence in exit decisions between neighbours: whether or not an individual
gasoline stations survives might not only depend on its own characteristics but could
also be influenced by characteristics of its neighbors. McMillen (1992) further notes
that both cases of spatial dependence produce heteroscedastic errors, which are
responsible for the inconsistent parameter estimates. To account for this spatial
interdependence, we apply a Bayesian spatial probit model, which was introduced
by LeSage (2000) and extends earlier work by Albert and Chip (1993). This spatial
autoregressive probit model has the following form:
y∗ = ρW y∗ + βX + ,
 ∼ N(0, Inσ2)
(2)
where y∗ represent the latent underlying unobservable utility level of the exit decision
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(e. g.: expected profit) of dimension m×1 with m being the total number of gasoline
stations. The block diagonal spatial weights matrixW captures the spatial structure
of the market (closeness between the individual gasoline stations). More specifically,
the element wij of the spatial weights (distance decay) matrixW of dimension m×m
is the inverse of the driving time from station i to station j, if station j is among the
ten nearest neighbors of i, and wij = 0 otherwise. Using the inverse of the driving
distance puts a higher weight on closer neighbors. By construction, W is row-
stochastic (non-negative and row sums equal 1). This results in the m × 1 vector
Wy∗ consisting of the spatially weighted average of competitors utility or profit
from leaving the market. Wy∗ represents the mechanism for modeling strategic
interaction between gasoline stations in the decision to leave the market. ρ is the
spatial correlation coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and measures the
strength of dependence.
The k exogenous variables are represented by the matrix X (including a con-
stant) of dimension m× k and β is the k × 1 vector of coefficients of the exogenous
variables.  is the m × 1 vector of independent and identically distributed errors.
The explanatory variables included in X are location specific characteristics (con-
venience stores, opening hours, attendant service, surface area), demand indicators
(commuting rates, population growth rates, a purchasing power proxy), the speed
limit of the street where the gas station is located and property prices as indicators
for the value of alternative use. Furthermore, we include dummy variables to cap-
ture the impact of branded and unbranded stations, which indicate if the station
operates independently or belongs to one of ten major brands of the Austrian retail
gasoline industry.
The Bayesian approach8 of modeling binary dependent variables treats the binary
0/1 observations of y as the unobserved net utility concerned with the exit/no exit
decisions, where the unobserved utility underlies the observed choice outcomes. For
example, in our case where the binary observed variable represents the closed/not
closed status of the stations, the decision to close the station would be made if the net
8For an introduction in Bayesian Econometrics see Koop (2003) and Koop et al. (2007).
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profit when shutting down versus staying in the market would be grater than zero.
The Bayesian way of estimating this latent profit is to replace it with parameters
that are estimated. In the case of a SAR probit model and when the estimates
of the unobserved parameter values y∗ are given, one can proceed to estimate the
remaining model parameters β and ρ from the same conditional distributions that
are used in the continuous dependent variable variant of the SAR model.9
More formally, the choice to exit/not exit the market depends on the difference
in the net profit: pi1i − pi0i, i = 1, . . . , n associated with the 0/1 indicators. pi1i
represents the profit of firm i when leaving the market and pi0i represents firm i
′s
profit of staying in the market. The probit model assumes that this difference
y∗ = pi1i − pi0i follows a normal distribution. We do not observe y∗, only the choice
made, which are reflected in
yi =
1, if y
∗
i > 0
0, if y∗i ≤ 0
(3)
If the vector of latent profits y∗ would be known, we would also know y, which
led Albert and Chip (1993) to conclude p(ρ, σ2|y∗) = p(ρ, σ2|y∗, y). This means,
if one views y∗ as an additional set of parameters to be estimated, then the joint
conditional posterior distribution for the model parameters β and σ takes the same
form as in the continuous dependent variant of the Bayesian regression problem,
rather than the problem involving a binary vector y. This approach was used by
LeSage and Pace (2009) to implement a Bayesian MCMC estimation procedure for
the spatial probit model. To carry out the MCMC procedure, it is necessary to
derive the full set of conditional posterior distributions for all parameters of interest
as well as for latent variables. Gelfand and Smith (1990) show that sampling from
the sequence of complete posterior distributions for all model parameters produces
a set of estimates that converge in the limit to the (joint) posterior distribution
of the parameters. To derive the conditional posterior distributions, we first need
9See LeSage and Pace (2009), chapter 5 and 10.
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to define prior distributions for all parameters. In Bayesian econometrics investi-
gators specify distributions, which represent prior beliefs about the distribution of
parameters before seeing the data. This prior information is combined with the data
distribution to produce posterior distributions which are the basis for inference. The
posterior distribution in this case represents a matrix-weighted average of sample
and prior information, but the weights are strongly influenced by the quantity of
data and available prior information. Therefore, if our prior information about the
parameter distribution is very limited and we have a big data set (like in our case),
then the posterior distribution puts more emphasis on the model and sample data
information, embodied in the likelihood. In this case Bayesian methods as well as
frequentists methods rely almost entirely on the model and sample data information
to provide inference for the parameters of interest. In our estimation, the prior dis-
tributions are taken to be diffuse wherever possible and conjugate priors elsewhere,
which are described in detail in Appendix A. Put differently, we let the data and
the model speak.
When rearranging equation 2 so that the dependent variable y∗ appears on the
left hand side only, one comes to the following expressions:
y∗ = (Im − ρW )−1βX + (Im − ρW )−1,
S(ρ) = (Im − ρW )−1 = Im + ρW + ρ2W 2 + ρ3W 3 + . . .
(4)
S(ρ) is the so called spatial spillover matrix which acts like a multiplier matrix
and captures the spatial spillover effects of higher - order neighboring relations.
Due to the non-linearity in the normal probability distribution the parameter
estimates β̂ of non-spatial probit models do not have the same marginal effects
interpretation as in standard regression problems. Thus the change in the depen-
dent variable y due to changes in the explanatory variable xr is determined by the
standard normal density in the following way:
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∂E[y|xr]/∂xr = φ(xr, βr)βr (5)
where βr ia a non-spatial probit model estimate and φ(·) is the density of the stan-
dard normal distribution.
In the SAR Probit model the non-spatial model estimates βr are replaced with
E(∂y/∂x
′
r) = (Im − ρW )−1Imβr, which is a m×m matrix. The diagonal elements
represent the direct effects - the effect of the change in the ith observation of the
exogenous variable xir on the own observation yi. The off-diagonal elements capture
the indirect or spatial spillover effects - the effect of the change in the ith observation
of the exogenous variable xir on other observations yj, j 6= i. By replacing βr in
equation 5 we can calculate the marginal effects for the spatial probit model. For
reporting issues we again have adopted the approach from LeSage and Pace (2009),
who built average summary measures for the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of
the coefficient matrix and thus report average direct, indirect and the average total
effects being the sum of the direct and indirect effects.
The estimated coefficients, standard deviations, direct, indirect and total effects
are reported in table 3. As already noted, the parameter estimates β from the SAR
probit model cannot be interpreted as the effect on the probability of a station to
exit the market due to changes in the explanatory variables.
The first point to note is that the spatial correlation coefficient ρ that is asso-
ciated which the spatial lag of the dependent variable Wy is significantly different
from zero at the 5% level. Thus the estimated coefficient ρ of -0.08 points to a
negative spatial dependence in firms’ decision to exit the market. Namely, the prob-
ability to exit for a particular gasoline station declines if its’ neighbor is more likely
to exit the gasoline market, ceteris paribus. Estimation experiments suggest that
the effects of regional and firm characteristics on the probability of exit would be
biased if these strategic interactions between neighboring competitors are ignored.
The effect estimates for the SAR Probit model are given in columns 4-6. These
are the basis for inference for the effect of changes of explanatory variables on the exit
probability of gasoline outlets as well as the spatial spillover effects on neighboring
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stations. Within the group of competition and spatial explanatory variables the
average distance to the ten nearest neighbors exerts a significant and negative direct
effect, implying a decrease in the exit probability of 0.42%, for a increase in the
average distance to the ten nearest neighbors by one minute. Thus, exits are more
likely for gasoline stations in markets where the degree of spatial differentiation is
low: the probability of exit decreases with the average distance to the ten nearest
neighbors. This finding is consistent with empirical studies on price setting in the
gasoline market: a high density of gasoline stations is found to intensify competition
and reduce prices. In contrast with the findings of Eckert and West (2005), we found
no effect for the number of discount neighbors on the closure probability of gasoline
stations in the Austrian market. Additionally, our regression results show that there
is no interrelation in the main model specification of exits and Aral stations which
where acquired by BP which is in contrast with the findings of Go¨tz and Gugler
(2006), who expect a positive effect on exit due to higher market concentration.
Nevertheless, the ARAL dummy stays insignificant in other model specifications
with different spatial weight matrices and number of MCMC draws. However, our
results suggests that stations operating non-stop have a lower exit probability of
3.15% compared to stations which have shorter opening hours. Worthwhile to point
out is that the indirect effect of this variable exhibits a positive and highly significant
effect - a station operated non-stop would actually raise the exit probability of its
neighbors.
Moreover, small and medium size stores had a positive direct effect, increasing the
probability of exiting. For categorical variables such as store size, we interpret the
magnitude of the effects as how a change in category from the omitted category (in
this case big size stations) would influence the probability of shutting down.
The population density has a negative direct impact in the exit probability of sta-
tions, whereas stations offering an attendant service are more likely to exit. It is
important to note, that the spatial spillover effects represented by the indirect effect
for the variables size, attendant service and population density all have the opposite
sign compered to the direct effect. The other explanatory variables of this group,
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namely, the speed limit of the street where the station is located, a purchase power
proxy, commuters and property prices do not contribute to the explanatory power
of the SAR probit model.
Overall, in accordance with the findings of previous studies10, our results suggest
the exit probability to be lower for large gasoline stations that are open for 24 hours
and located in a region with a high population density.
10Eckert and West (2005) observe that gasoline station in the Vancouver market operating non-
stop have a lower exit probability. Carranza et al. (2012) examine the effect of a price floor in
Quebec on station shutdown and find a negative effect for convenient stores, number of pumps and
number of islands, but a positive effect for full service on the exit probability of gasoline stations.
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Spatial Bayesian Probit Estimation
Dependent Variable: EXIT
Coefficient Sd. Dev. Direct Indirect Total
Constant -0.622 0.5599∗
Competition and Spatial Variables
NO. INDEPENDENTS -0.0168 0.0192 -0.005 0.0004 -0.0046
AVERAGE DISTANCE 10NB 0.0042 0.0034∗ -0.001 0.0001 -0.0011
DEALER -0.0728 0.0674 -0.021 0.0019 -0.0198
UNBRANDED 0.0725 0.0792 0.021 -0.0018 0.0195
ARAL 0.1036 0.1492 0.033 -0.002 0.030
Location Specific Variables
SHOP 0.0296 0.0790 0.008 -0.0008 0.0078
24H OPEN -0.0315 0.0301∗∗∗ -0.099 0.0083 0.0907
SPEED: ≤ 40km/h -0.904 0.2000 -0.038 0.0031 -0.0352
SPEED: 40− 60km/h -0.1413 0.1800 -0.053 0.0044 -0.0491
SPEED: 61− 80km/h -0.1097 0.1919 -0.041 0.0033 -0.0382
ATTENDANT 0.2540 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.078 -0.0069 0.0715
SIZE ≤ 800m2 0.4365 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.138 -0.0120 0.1264
SIZE: 800− 2000m2 0.3395 0.0732∗∗∗ 0.107 -0.0093 0.0979
Indicators of demand and value of alternative use
POPDENS -0.0022 0.0017∗ -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0006
PURCHASE POWER -0.5331 0.9367 -0.169 0.0150 -0.1546
COMMUTERS 0.0947 0.3973 0.033 -0.0029 0.0309
PROPERTY -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Spatial Correlation
Wy -0.0821 0.0525∗∗
∗∗∗significant at 1%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗significant at 10%
Dummies for missing values and fixed effects for the 9 Austrian federal states included.
Table 3: SAR Estimation
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To proof the robustness of the main model, we estimate the exit probability with
different spatial weight matrices (five and fifteen nearest neighbors) and vary the
number of draws within the Bayesian estimation process. In both cases there are
only minuscule changes in the estimation results. Furthermore, the estimation of
the main model was also carried out with a redefined dependent variable. Namely,
in this definition of exit we exclude the stations which changed their brand, so that
the dependent variable captures only real physical shutdowns. For the most part
estimation results do not change. Explanatory variables presented in table 3 stay
significant. In addition, the dummy variable SHOP contributes to the explanatory
power of the model with a negative sign, which means that the exit probability of
stations running a shop decreases. With this alternative definition of the dependent
variable we also find negative spatial correlation, however, the spatial correlation
parameter rho is significant only at the 10% level.
4 Conclusion
The present paper examines the shutdowns of retail gasoline stations in the Austrian
market by estimating a Bayesian spatial probit model. The estimation results are
in line with related empirical studies of the rationalization process in this market.
The network of gasoline stations in Austria tends to fewer, bigger stations with
no attendant service, but other costumer attracting features like extended opening
hours. With a spatial econometric model we are able to capture the local competition
character of this market. The exit probability of gasoline stations in Austria exhibit
a negative spatial correlation, meaning that the shutdown of neighboring stations
lowers the competitions in a local market and that this event has a spillover effect on
other stations in this market. Our results thus provide some first empirical evidence
on spatial interactions in firms strategic location decisions in the (Austrian) gasoline
market.
In future research, the direct and indirect effects of explanatory variables as well
as the effects of ownership structure (membership in large networks) on location
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decisions need to be investigated in more detail. The literature proposes also other
estimators for binary spatial models, for example McMillen (1992) - EM-estimator,
Beron and Vijverberg (2004) - recursive importance sampling (RIS) and Pinske and
Slade (1998) - GMM estimator. To additionally proof the robustness of the results,
estimation could be carried out with these methodologies. However, Calabrese and
Elkink (2014) who compare the performance of these estimators for specific types
of models through an extensive Monte Carlo simulation study, conclude that when
focusing on spatial autocorrelation only and with a low level of spatial dependence
- which is the case for our data - the Bayesian estimation methodology (LeSage,
2000) outperforms the other estimators. Additional space for future research could
be found by separation of our dependent variable. It would be an improvement
for the estimation to separately analyze the categories ”‘shut down”’ and changed
brand”’. However, this extension would require an multivariate spatial probit model
which raise additional estimation difficulties. We hope that empirical research along
these lines will improve our knowledge of firms’ entry and exit behavior in a spatial
context and thus contribute to our understanding of the determinants of local market
power.
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Appendix A Prior distributions
Since the introduction of prior distributions in the modeling process is a crucial as-
pect of Bayesian estimation methods - the specified prior distributions for the model
parameters are combined with the likelihood function to produce the posterior dis-
tributions - we want to describe our choice of priors in more detail. Equation 6
shows the spatial autoregressive probit model. In this model we want to estimate
the model parameters θ = (β, σ, ρ) and therefore we have to specify prior distribu-
tions for these parameters. Following LeSage and Pace (2009) the vector β and σ2 is
assigned a normal inverse gamma (NIG) prior. This form of prior makes the normal
prior for β conditional on an inverse gamma prior distribution for the model param-
eter σ2. Equation 7 specifies that the prior distribution for β follows a multivariate
normal distribution conditional on σ2 and the marginal distribution for σ takes the
form of a inverse gamma distribution.
y∗ = ρW y∗ + βX + ,
 ∼ N(0, Inσ2)
(6)
pi(β, σ2) ∼ NIG(c, T, a, b)
= pi(β|σ2)pi(σ2)
= N(c, σ2T )IG(a, b)
(7)
The parameters of the posterior distribution are a weighted average of the prior
values and the likelihood, which is represented by the model and the data. Since we
have a great deal of uncertainty regarding the prior distribution but a large data set,
we want to put more weight on the data and the model. Therefore, we need to set
appropriate distribution parameters for our prior distributions. The multivariate
normal prior for β can be made almost diffuse by choosing c = 0 and setting T
equal to a diagonal matrix whoose elements are sufficiently large (very large prior
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variance for β). The prior distribution of σ can be made uninformative by setting
the parameters of the inverse gamma prior distribution a = b = 0. Since the spatial
correlation parameter ρ plays a very important role in our model, we need to clarify
the prior distribution for this parameter. Sun et al. (1999) argue that the feasible
range for the parameter ρ is restricted in the following way: this parameter must
lie in the interval [λ−1min,λ
−1
max] where λmin and λmax represent the minimum and
maximum eigenvalues of the row-stochastic spatial weight matrix W . Therefore,
we assign a uniform prior over the restricted support region for ρ (see equation 8),
which makes all outcomes within the feasible range equally possible.
pi(ρ) ∼ U(λ−1min, λ−1max) (8)
We obtain the following joint posterior distribution:
p(β, σ2, ρ|y,X,W ) ∝ f(y,X,W |β, σ2, ρ)pi(β, σ2)pi(ρ), (9)
where f(·) denotes the probit likelihood and pi(·) represents the prior density of
the parameters.
Worthwhile to note is that the priors for β and σ are independent from that
for ρ, which does not imply independence in the posterior distributions for these
parameters.
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